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Abstract—Privacy is needed in ad hoc networks. An ad hoc on-demand position-based private routing algorithm, called AO2P, is
proposed for communication anonymity. Only the position of the destination is exposed in the network for route discovery. To discover
routes with the limited routing information, a receiver contention scheme is designed for determining the next hop. Pseudo identifiers
are used for data packet delivery after a route is established. Real identities (IDs) for the source nodes, the destination nodes, and the
forwarding nodes in the end-to-end connections are kept private. Anonymity for a destination relies on the difficulty of matching a
geographic position to a real node ID. This can be enforced by the use of secure position service systems. Node mobility enhances
destination anonymity by making the match of a node ID with a position momentary. To further improve destination privacy, R-AO2P is
proposed. In this protocol, the position of a reference point, instead of the position of the destination, is used for route discovery.
Analytical models are developed for evaluating the delay in route discovery and the probability of route discovery failure. A simulator
based on ns-2 is developed for evaluating network throughput. Analysis and simulation results show that, while AO2P preserves
communication privacy in ad hoc networks, its routing performance is comparable with other position-based routing algorithms.
Index Terms—Ad hoc routing protocol, anonymity, communication privacy, channel access mechanism.
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1I NTRODUCTION
P
ROTECTING personal privacy is a prime concern for the
emerging pervasive systems. As an important part of
privacy, the user anonymity can improve security by
making it difficult for adversaries to trace their potential
victims and to conduct target-specific attacks. Achieving
node privacy is challenging in ad hoc networks, where
routing schemes rely on the cooperation and information
exchange among the nodes. In routing algorithms such as
AODV [1], DSR [2], and DSDV [3], a node has to disclose its
identity (ID) in the network for building a route. Node
activities, such as sending or receiving data, are highly
traceable and, consequently, nodes are vulnerable to attacks
and disruptions.
The privacy preservation approaches in the literature do
not directly extend to ad hoc networks. The use of broadcast
[4] or multicast [5] for receiver privacy are not suitable; as in
ad hoc networks, the bandwidth is limited, and multicast
itself is a challenging problem [6]. The K-anonymity
algorithm [7] achieves anonymity by keeping the entity of
interest within a group. Yet it is not easy to maintain such a
group with a fixed proxy in an ad hoc network due to the
node mobility and the continuous join-and-leave activities.
The dynamic nature also makes it difficult to use the
anonymity solutions based on trusted third parties [8]. In
approaches applying the onion structure [9], [10], where
anonymity can be realized in a multihop path by keeping
each node along the path aware of only its previous hop
and next hop, the cost of using public keys is high.
Geographic or position-based routing algorithms for ad
hoc networks have been widely studied [11]. In addition to
node ID, extra information, such as the positions of the
nodes, is used for making routing decisions. Since it is
unlikely that two ad hoc nodes are concurrently at exactly
the same position, the match between a position and an ID is
unique. Therefore, in position-based routing algorithms, if
the positions have been exposed for routing, node IDs do not
need to be revealed. If an adversary cannot match a position
to a node ID correctly, node anonymity can be achieved.
However, using position instead of ID for route manage-
ment in traditional positioning routing algorithms does not
guarantee node anonymity. These algorithms rely on the
position exchange among the neighboring nodes. A pre-
vious hop knows the positions of its neighbors, so that it can
select the next hop that is the closest to the destination. Such
an information exchange is normally through a periodic
message that is locally broadcast by each node. The message
is called a “hello” message and carries an updated position
of the sender. These time-based position reports make a
node highly traceable. An eavesdropper can determine
whether the “hello” messages are from the same node based
on the time they are sent out. The trajectory of a node
movement can be well-known to other nodes even when its
ID is intentionally hidden. It is much easier to obtain a
node ID based on its trajectory. Furthermore, if a tracer has
determined the node ID correctly, it can always stay close to
this node and monitor its behavior. The transmission jitter
for “hello” messages may make tracing a little more
difficult, yet it is not sufficient to protect a node’s trajectory
from being discovered.
Lack of privacy in traditional positioning ad hoc routing
algorithms is mainly caused by the extensive position
information exposure. To achieve communication anonym-
ity, a position-based ad hoc routing algorithm, named
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relatively high node densities, where the positions of
destinations are the only position information disclosed in
the network for routing. In AO2P, a route is discovered by
delivering a routing request message from the source
towards the position of the destination. However, AO2P
does not rely on the local position information exchange. To
determine the next hop with limited position information,
an approach similar to Anycast [12] is developed, which
relies on a proposed receiver contention channel access
mechanism.
In AO2P, once a previous hop sends out a routing
request, its neighboring nodes who receive the request will
contend to access the channel to be the next hop. In the
receiver contention mechanism, receiving nodes are divided
into different classes according to how close they can bring
the routing request toward the destination. A receiver
geographically closer to the destination is assigned to a class
with a higher priority, and it generally can win the
contention. This results in the routes with a lower number
of hops. Fewer forwarders are needed and, hence, the ad hoc
channel is shared by fewer nodes. In a network with a fixed
data rate, these routes generally have a better routing
performance.
Once a route is built, pseudo IDs and temporary MAC
addresses are used for the nodes in the routes, such as
sources, destinations, and intermediate forwarders. Since
the node identities are not disclosed, communication
anonymity can be achieved. For a destination whose
position is revealed, its privacy is preserved by hiding the
match between a position and its ID through the secure
position management scheme. Eavesdroppers or attackers
only know that a node at a certain position will receive data,
but they do not know which node it is. On the other hand,
the routing accuracy is guaranteed because at most one
node can be at a specific geographic position at one time.
The position and the time are used as the inputs of the hash
function, which generates a node’s pseudo ID. The
possibility that two nodes have the same pseudo ID so that
data may be delivered to the wrong node is negligible.
AO2P mitigates the attacks on node anonymity from
both external and internal attackers with the assistance of
secure position services. Node authentication and encryp-
tion can prevent an external attacker from learning a node’s
position. For an internal attacker, position management
policy will be enforced so that a node cannot abuse position
information for tracing purposes. Such an attacker may
obtain fractions of position information of its target.
However, the information is incomplete and will not be
enough for attacker to trace a moving target.
The contributions of this paper are the design and
routing performance evaluation for the proposed anon-
ymous positioning routing algorithm. We build analytical
models for evaluating the performance metrics, such as the
delay in route discovery and the probability of a route
discovery failure with or without position errors. We use
simulation to evaluate performance metrics, such as the
impact of destination mobility, the hop counts in the
discovered routes, and the network end-to-end throughput.
Node anonymity can be evaluated in terms of the size of
anonymity set [13], probability [10], [14], and entropy [15].
This is our on-going research and will be presented in a
future paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
briefly presents related research. In Section 3, the details of
the routing algorithm are presented. In Section 4, the delay
for the routing discovery and the probability of routing
discovery failure are analyzed. Section 5 shows analysis and
simulation results. Section 6 provide the conclusions and
future works.
2R ELATED RESEARCH
Anonymous communication in ad hoc networks has been
studied in [16]. A novel untraceable on-demand routing
protocol, named ANODR, is proposed. Onion structure is
used for routing discovery. To reduce the cost and latency of
the encryption/decryption, a symmetric key based Boomer-
ang Onions is used. Once a route is found, pseudorandom
numbers are used as temporary IDs for the nodes along the
route. Each node only knows the pseudo numbers from its
previous hop and next hop. The communication privacy is
achieved because real IDs are not revealed. The protocol is
robust to intrusion since the intrusion in a single node en
route does not result in ID exposure.
A position-based ad hoc routing algorithm, named a
greedy perimeter stateless routing (GPSR), is presented in
[17]. A packet is always forwarded to the next hop that is
geographically closest to the destination. Such an approach
is scalable since it does not need route discovery and
maintenance, and the position information is exchanged
locally among neighbor nodes by periodically sending out a
beacon. GPSR may not always find the optimum route.
When nodes are not uniformly distributed in the network,
there will be dead ends, in which a node cannot find any
next hop closer to the destination. GPSR solves this problem
by routing around the perimeter of its local region. Other
approaches to solving the dead end problem, named Face
Routing and GFG (Greedy-Face-Greedy) schemes, are
proposed in [18]. Some other delivery-guaranteed methods
are based on the single-path strategy [19], [20]. A route from
the source to the destination is built before data packets can
be delivered.
The position-based routing algorithms depend on the
position availability. It is assumed that a source is able to
get the position of its destination. The Global Positioning
System (GPS) helps a node to get its own position. How a
source gets the position of its destination is a challenging
task. In an ad hoc/cellular integrated environment [21], the
position of a destination can be obtained through paging or
the short message service through the cellular network. A
source node sends a position request to the cellular
network. The cellular network pages the destination. The
destination replies with its position, which is forwarded to
the source. This out-of-band solution is simple since it has
little signaling overhead and operational complexity. When
an out-of-band server is not available, in-band position
servers are designed. In [22], each node has a geographical
region around a fixed center. The region is called a virtual
home region (VHR) and the ad hoc node updates its
position information to all the nodes residing in its VHR.
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its VHR follows a hash function, so that other nodes can
acquire a node’s position by sending request to the right
VHR. A similar distributed position service system, named
DLM (Distributed Location Management), is studied in [23].
3 AO2P ROUTING ALGORITHM
In this section, we first introduce a secure position service
system that is necessary for privacy preservation in
positioning ad hoc routing algorithms. We then describe
the proposed anonymous routing algorithm, where the
details on AO2P route discovery and maintenance are
given. Next, we present a receiver classification scheme,
followed with the receiver contention scheme. Based on
these two schemes, AO2P can process efficient route
discovery. Finally, an enhanced algorithm that further
improves destination anonymity is given.
3.1 Position Management
We propose a virtual home region (VHR)-based distributed
secure position service, named DISPOSER. An ad hoc node
is assumed to be able to obtain its own geographic position
through GPS. Each node has a VHR, which is a geographi-
cal region around a fixed center. The relationship between a
node ID and its VHR center follows a hash function. This
function is predefined and known to all the nodes who join
the network. A number of servers, which are also ad hoc
nodes, are distributed in the network. A node updates its
position to the servers located in its VHR, to which other
nodes send position request acquiring this node’s position.
A node updates its position to its VHR when the distance
between its current position and the last reported position
exceeds a threshold value. The threshold value is deter-
mined by finding out that, if a destination moves a certain
distance away from the position known to the source, what
the probability is of a routing failure caused by this position
drift. Simulation is done to study the relationship between
this threshold value and the probability of a routing failure
in Section 5.2.2. Since the positions of VHRs are known,
position update and position request can use the AO2P
routing algorithm. In this way, DISPOSER message delivery
does not require a node to process a time-based position
update to its neighboring nodes.
DISPOSER enhances position security. Only a small
number of trusted nodes can act as position servers. To
obtain the position of a certain node, a requester has to send
a signed position request. The position information is
encrypted and will not be learned by other users during
the position management. Positions are used for routing
only. A mechanism has been designed, which constrains a
node to use position for route discovery only. After
obtaining a node position, the node requester has to prove
to the servers that it has built a meaningful communication
with that node as its destination, normally by showing a
ticket assigned by the destination. The position abuse when
a node continuously sends position requests for tracing a
target node is prevented. More details on DISPOSER
security procedures are in [24].
When the source gets the position of its destination, it also
gets the time when the position is updated and an
authentication code. The time is needed for routing
accuracy. The secret code can be a random number, which
is generated and sent to the position server by the
destination along with its position update. The authentica-
tion code is used for destination authentication in the AO2P
route discovery stage.
3.2 AO2P Routing Protocol
In AO2P, a source discovers the route through the delivery
of a routing request to its destination. A node en-route will
generate a pseudo node ID and a temporary MAC address.
Once a route is built up, data is forwarded from the source
to the destination based on the pseudo IDs. This section
gives the details on AO2P routing discovery. Other issues,
such as data delivery, route maintenance, and pseudo ID
management, are addressed.
Once a source needs to find the route to its destination, it
first generates a pseudo ID and a temporary MAC address
for itself through a globally defined hash function using its
position and the current time as the inputs. Such a
procedure makes the probability that two active nodes
(i.e., nodes involved in routing) have the same ID and MAC
address small and negligible. The source then sends out a
routing request (rreq) message.
The rreq message carries the information needed for
routing, such as the position of the destination and the
distance from this source to the destination, as well as the
source pseudo ID. Since it is possible that another node has
updated the same position (yet at a different time) to the
position servers, a destination challenge message is carried
in the rreq to make sure that the right destination will be
reached. This message is also a result of a hash function, of
which the inputs are the position of the destination and the
time at which this position is updated. rreq carries the
challenge message instead of the time for less information
revelation. rreq also carries a Time-to-Live (TTL) number
that deals with the possible loop. TTL is the maximum
number of the hops a rreq can be forwarded. A source node
can estimate the TTL value according to the distance from
the source to the destination and the radio transmission
range for each hop.
The neighboring nodes around the source, called
receivers, will receive the rreq. A receiver checks the
destination challenge message to find out whether it is the
destination. If not, a receiver assigns itself to a receiver class
following the rules in Section 3.3. Each receiver uses a hash
function to generate a pseudo ID and a temporary MAC
address. The inputs of the hash function are the receiver’s
position and the time it receives the rreq. The receivers then
contend for the wireless channel to send out a hop reply
(hrep) message in a so-called rreq contention phase. Details
of this receiver-contention mechanism are described in
Section 3.4. The receiver who has successfully sent out the
hrep will be the next hop. Its pseudo ID is carried in the hrep.
On receiving the hrep, the source replies with a confirm
(cnfm) message. Its next hop replies to this message with an
ack. Upon receiving the ack, the source saves the pseudo ID
and the temporary MAC address of the next hop in its
routing table.
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sender.
1 It sends out the modified rreq, which carries the
distance from itself to the destination. The TTL value is
reduced by 1. Neighboring nodes around it will contend to
be its next hop. Once the sender receives a hrep, it couples
the pseudo ID and the temporary MAC address of its next
hop with those of its previous hop and saves the pairs in the
routing table.
The searching of the next hop is repeated until the
destination receives the rreq. After identifying the destina-
tion challenge message, the destination sends out a hrep.
Based on Section 3.4, it can always send out the hrep
successfully. After receiving the cnfm from its previous hop,
the destination sends a routing reply (rrep) message through
the reverse path to the source. The destination also finds the
corresponding authentication code according to the posi-
tion carried in the rreq and encrypts the code with the secret
key of its public/secret key pair. The encrypted result is
included in the rrep and sent to the source. The source finds
out whether it reaches the right destination by decrypting
the information with the destination’s public key and
comparing the authentication code with the one it obtained
through the position request.
The message flow in AO2P routing discovery is shown in
Fig. 1. The frames for important control messages are
shown in Fig. 2.
A route discovery failure will occur when a sender
cannot find a legitimate next hop. Routing discovery failure
may also be caused due to destination mobility. A typical
case for this type of routing failure is that a rreq has been
forwarded close to the position at which the destination was
expected to be, yet the destination cannot receive the rreq
because it has moved away. In both cases, a routing
discovery failure report will be sent back to the source. The
source will start a new route search based on the
destination’s most updated position after a backoff time.
After a route is built up, data packets are delivered
following the pseudo ID and temporary MAC address pairs
in the routing tables. Routing maintenance mechanisms in
traditional ad hoc routing algorithms can be used for AO2P.
When a route is broken, an error message will be sent back
to the source by the node who has discovered the broken
link. In AO2P, during the communication, the destination
will update its new position to the source through the
reverse route. The source can thus start a new routing
discovery using the updated position information.
A node will generate a pair of a pseudo ID and a
temporary MAC address only when it receives a rreq.I fi t
wins the next hop contention and is included in the route, it
will use the pair for data delivery. Otherwise, the ID and
MAC address pair will be deleted. It is possible that a node
is included in more than one route. In this case, only one
pseudo ID and one temporary MAC address are used. A
node deletes the pair of the pseudo ID and the temporary
MAC address if the route in which the pair is used no
longer exists. This happens when data delivery is finished, a
routing error message is received, or the pair has not been
used for a long time.
3.3 Receiver Classification
A receiver determines its node class by finding that, if it is
the next hop, how much closer (this geographic distance is
defined as  d) it can move a rreq from the sender toward
the destination.  d can be calculated because the distance
between the receiver and the destination is known based on
their positions and the distance between the sender and the
destination is carried in the rreq.
A simple illustrated example of node classification is
shown in Fig. 3. In this example, all nodes except the
destination are divided into four node classes. A distance of
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1. A sender is defined as the source or an intermediate node who
forwards the rreq message.
Fig. 1. Message flow in AO2P routing discovery.
Fig. 2. Frames of control messages in AO2P routing discovery. (a) rreq
frame. (b) hrep frame. (c) cnfm frame.d is calculated as d ¼ r=3, where r is the maximum radio
coverage of the ad hoc channel. Nodes with  d   2d (e.g.,
node A, as it falls in the circle centered at the destination
with a radius of l   2d) belong to class 1, which has the
highest priority. Nodes with d    d<2d (e.g., node B) and
nodes with 0    d<d (e.g., nodes C and D) belong to
Class 2 and 3, respectively, and have lower priorities. For
nodes E, F, and G,  d<0. They belong to class 4 and will
lead the rreq away from the destination. Other nodes, such
as H and I, are out of the sender’s transmission range and
cannot receive the rreq. Note that the destination is a special
node. It has the highest priority to access the channel with a
class of 0. In this paper, we investigated the algorithm in
which only nodes of class 1, 2, and 3 will contend to be
legitimate receivers. A node of class 4 will not attend the
contention because it leads a rreq away from the destination.
The node classification scheme is used only for simplicity
of presentation and will be used in the rest of the paper. In
more complicated schemes, rules for node classification can
be adaptive based on node density. When the density is
high, only the nodes that can greatly reduce the distance
between the rreq and the destination should be assigned to
the class with a high priority. On the other hand, if the
nodes are sparsely distributed, a node which leads the rreq
away from the destination can also be a possible legitimate
receiver. Such a rule adaptation, for example, can be made
by adjusting the value of d. Besides the distance to the
destination, other criteria, such as signal quality, the
remaining power of a node, and node mobility, can also
be considered in node classification.
3.4 AO2P hrep Contention Mechanism
The receiver-contention mechanism used in the hrep
contention phase is EY-NPMA (Elimination Yield—Non-
preemptive Priority Multiple Access), the channel access
mechanism for HIPERLAN 1 [25], [26]. The main reasons
for using EY-NPMA for hrep contention are: 1) EY-NPMA is
a class-based channel access mechanism, while, in AO2P,
receivers are divided into different classes, 2) the prob-
ability of a successful transmission for EY-NPMA is very
high even when there are a large number of contending
nodes, and 3) EY-NPMA has been widely used and tested.
For better understanding of the entire AO2P algorithm and
performance analysis, this section gives the details of the
hrep contention mechanism.
Like EY-NPMA, the hrep contention phase of AO2P is
further divided into three phases: the prioritization phase,
the elimination phase, and the yield phase.
The prioritization phase starts a synchronization interval
after receiving the rreq. It allows only the receivers with the
highest channel access priority among the contending ones
to participate in the next phase. A number of slots, the same
as the number of different priority classes, are reserved for
this phase. A receiver with a class of c can send a burst in
slot c only if no burst is sent in the previous
c   1 prioritization slots. This also means that it has the
highest priority in this contending cycle. This receiver will
then enter the next phase. If a receiver senses a burst in any
of the previous slots, it will quit from hrep contention. In
AO2P, the receivers that cannot enter the next phase will
drop the rreq. The first slot of the prioritization phase is
reserved for destination, which is called Destination Ac-
knowledgment Slot. Only a destination can send a burst on
this slot. In this way, the destination receiving a rreq can
always have access to the channel successfully.
The elimination phase starts immediately after the
transmission of the prioritization burst and consists of a
number of slots. An AO2P receiver who enters this phase
will transmit burst in a randomly selected number of
continuous slots, starting from the first one in this phase.
The receivers transmitting the longest series of bursts will
survive. After the end of the burst transmission, each
receiver senses the channel for the duration of the
elimination survival verification slot. If the channel is
sensed to be idle, the receiver is admitted to the yield
phase; otherwise, it drops itself from contention. The length
of the burst follows a truncated geometric probability
distributed function. A transmission parameter, PE, is used
to adjust the burst length. Let mES to be the number of
overall elimination slots and PeðnÞ be the probability that
the burst is transmitted in the consecutive n slots. PeðnÞ is
specified as:
PeðnÞ¼
ð1   PEÞPn
E 0   n<m ES;
Pn
E n ¼ mES:
 
ð1Þ
The yield phase starts immediately after the end of the
elimination survival verification interval. Before transmit-
ting a hrep, a receiver will yield for a number of slots from 0
to mYSwith equal likelihood. It listens to the channel and, if
the channel is sensed idle during the yield listening interval,
it will send out the hrep. Otherwise, the receiver loses
contention and drops the rreq.L e tPyðnÞ to be the
probability that a receiver will wait for n slots before it
sends out the hrep. Then,
PyðnÞ¼1=ðmYSþ 1Þ;0   n   mYS: ð2Þ
When more than one receiver sends out an hrep at the
same time, a hrep collision occurs. In this case, the sender
will resend the rreq. On the other hand, if the sender cannot
hear any burst in the prioritization period, it means there
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Fig. 3. Classifying nodes based on the positions.are no potential next hops at that time. In that case, it will
backoff and resend the rreq after a backoff time.
The complete channel access mechanism for AO2P
routing discovery is summarized in Fig. 4. A traditional
channel access mechanism such as CSMA/CA is consid-
ered to be used for a rreq or a data packet. Before a rreq
message or a data packet is sent, the channel has to be
sensed idle for a distributed interframe space (DIFS) of
time. There is a short interframe space (SIFS) between
message exchange for data packet forwarding and rreq
forwarding, except for the time interval between a rreq and
its hrep. This interval depends on the duration of the hrep
contention phase. In AO2P, a rreq retransmission has a
higher priority. The sender has to wait for only a SIFS before
the retransmission. To avoid any other transmission during
a hrep contention period, DIFS has to be longer than the
longest idle period in the hrep contention phase. In AO2P,
DIFS has to be longer than the entire yield phase.
3.5 Communication Anonymity and Privacy
Enhancement
In AO2P, the identities for the two ends (source and
destination) of a communication are anonymous to other
nodes. AO2P also protects the privacy for nodes acting as
intermediate forwarders, as they do not need to expose any
information during data delivery. This is important for
communication privacy in ad hoc networks. Unlike wired
networks, in which a forwarder is normally a fixed router
without the necessity to hide any information from others,
in ad hoc networks, a forwarder is also a potential source or
destination. The exposure of private information of a node
during its action of forwarding may cause privacy loss in its
previous or future communication sessions.
Destination has the lowest privacy because its position is
revealed to the network for routing. Node movement can
enhance the destination privacy because, if a node is
mobile, the match between a position and the node ID is
momentary. A single position release may not lead to severe
privacy degradation.
Protecting destination position from adversaries can
further improve destination anonymity. To hide this
information from the eavesdroppers, a position of a reference
point can be used in a rreq instead of the real position of the
destination. The corresponding routing protocol is called
AO2P with reference point, or R-AO2P. The reference point
is on the extended line from the sender to the destination, as
shown in Fig. 5a. The distance between the reference point
and the destination is a large random value, based on which
a tracer cannot estimate the real position of the destination.
The node classification for receivers can use the similar
rules as those in Section 3.3, with the difference that the
class of a receiver is determined by how closer it can
process a packet to the reference point. The rules for node
classification based on destination and a reference point are
compared in Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b. S1, S2, and S3 are the areas
where the nodes belonging to class 1, class 2, and class 3 are
located. The solid lines in Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b are part of the
circles centered at the reference point and the destination,
respectively (referring to Fig. 3). Generally, a node closer to
the reference point is also closer to the destination. Nodes at
some special positions have the higher node class levels in
R-AO2P than in AO2P. For example, node at position A has
a class level of 3 in AO2P, yet it has a class level of 2 in R-
AO2P. In R-AO2P, Node A has a better opportunity to win
the hrep contention. The routes discovered by R-AO2P may
then have larger hop counts. However, the hop count
increase is not significant because nodes at most positions
have the same class level. It should also be noted that, for R-
AO2P, some nodes residing in S3 may lead a packet away
from the destination.
In R-AO2P, the next hop will obtain the position of the
destination from the sender after it wins the hrep contention.
The position is encrypted by a Diffie-Hellman key to keep it
from being learned by other nodes. The Diffie-Hellman key,
not the public key of the next hop, is used to prevent the
identity exposure for the intermediate nodes. The Diffie-
Hellman key is set up during hrep and cnfm exchange. hrep
carries the initiation of the key and cnfm replies with the rest
part of the key. cnfm also carries the encrypted position of
the destination. After receiving the position of the destina-
tion, the next hop can generate a reference point at the
extended line from itself to the destination and sends out a
rreq carrying the position of the new reference point. The
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Fig. 4. Illustration of AO2P channel access mechanism in routing discovery.procedure is repeated until the rreq finally reaches the
destination.
4 AO2P PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In AO2P, a hop reply (hrep) contention period may cause
extra delay in the route discovery. If such a delay is large, a
routing failure or a route discovery failure may occur
because the destination may have already moved away
from the position known to the source. A route discovery
failure may also be caused by inaccurate position informa-
tion or the network topology where a next hop cannot be
found.Inthissection,wefirstanalyzethehrepaveragedelay.
Based on this delay, the average time needed for a successful
next hop determination is calculated. We then present the
analysis for theprobability of a routediscovery failure under
different node distributions and position accuracy.
4.1 Delay for AO2P Next Hop Searching
The definitions of major symbols used in our analysis are
listed in Table 1. We calculate DREQðnÞ, the average time
for next hop determination when there are initially n
contenders.
Since we are considering a network with relatively high
node density, for the simplicity of analysis, it can be
assumed that, for a sender, neighbors belonging to the class
with the highest priority are always available. Thus, in the
hrep prioritization phase, the delay is approximately the
time duration for two slots: the destination acknowledg-
ment slot and the slot for the class with the highest priority.
It is assumed that n receivers belong to the class with the
highest priority and will enter the elimination phase upon
receiving a rreq. The probability that a number of s receivers
will succeed in the elimination phase and enter the yield
phase, denoted as PEfsjng, is:
PEfsjng¼ n
s
   X mES
j¼0
PEfB ¼ jg
sPEfB<j g
n s; ð3Þ
where PEfB ¼ jg is the probability that a burst has a length
of j, as that in (1). PEfB<j g is the probability that a burst
has a length less than j and is specified as follows:
PEfB<j g¼
X j 1
i¼0
PeðiÞ¼1   P
j
E: ð4Þ
The receivers with the longest burst will enter the yield
phase. Let   B Bsðs;nÞ be the average number of bursts a
successful receiver sends, on the condition that there are
n receivers entering the elimination phase and s receivers
win. In this case,
  B Bsðs;nÞ¼
n
s
  
PmES
j¼0 jPEfB ¼ jg
sPEfB<j g
n s
PEfsjng
: ð5Þ
The average burst length that a successful receiver sends
when there are n receivers in the elimination phase,
denoted as   B BEðnÞ, is calculated as:
  B BEðnÞ¼
X n
s¼1
  B Bsðs;nÞPEfsjng: ð6Þ
In the yield phase, let PYfT ¼ 1jsg be the probability of a
successful transmission when there are s receivers joining
the contention. A successful transmission occurs only when
one receiver waits for fewer yield slots than all of the others.
In this case,
PYfT ¼ 1jsg¼ s
1
   X mYS
j¼0
PYfL ¼ jgPYfL>j g
s 1; ð7Þ
where L is the number of yield slots a successful receiver
will wait. PYfL ¼ jg depends on (2), and
PYfL>j g¼
X mYS
i¼jþ1
PyðiÞ¼
mYS  j
mYSþ 1
: ð8Þ
The average number of slots a successful receiver will
yield before transmitting hrep when there are s of
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Fig. 5. Reference point and the receiver classification. (a) Node classification based on a reference point. (b) Node classification based on
destination.n receivers entering the yield phase, denoted as   L Lsðs;nÞ,i s
calculated as:
  L Lsðs;nÞ¼
PmYS
j¼0 jPYfL ¼ jgPYfL>j g
s 1
PYfT ¼ 1jsg
: ð9Þ
The average number of slots a successful receiver will
yield before it sends the hrep when n receivers are in the
elimination phase, denoted as   L LYðnÞ, is as follows:
  L LYðnÞ¼
X n
s¼1
  L Lsðs;nÞPYfT ¼ 1jsgPEfsjng: ð10Þ
Let the time duration for a slot in the prioritization
phase, the elimination phase, and the yield phase be iPS,
iES, and iYS, respectively. Let iSYNC be the time interval for
synchronization before hrep contention. The average delay
for a successful hrep contention in the first attempt under
the condition that there are n receivers entering the
elimination phase, denoted as DTðnÞ, is:
DTðnÞ¼iSYNC þ 2iPS þ   B BEðnÞiES þ   L LYðnÞiYSþ iES; ð11Þ
where 2iPS stands for the two slots in the prioritization
phase and the iES at the end is for the survival verification
interval.
The corresponding average time for a successful next
hop searching cycle from rreq to the ack, denoted as tsuccðnÞ,
is given as:
tsuccðnÞ¼irreq þ DTðnÞþihrep þ iSIFS þ icnfm þ iSIFS þ iack;
ð12Þ
where irreq, ihrep, icnfm, iack, and iSIFS are the time duration
for rreq, hrep, cnfm, ack, and SIFS, respectively.
In hrep contention phase, a transmission failure is caused
by hrep collision when more than one receivers send hrep
simultaneously. After detecting a hrep collision, the sender
will wait for a SIFS before it resends a rreq.
Let   L0 L0ðw;s;nÞ be the average number of slots in the yield
phase in a failed hrep contention when w of s receivers have
the shortest yield phase and send the hrep. n is the number
of contenders in the elimination phase. Let PYfT ¼ wjsg be
the corresponding probability of such a case. It is given as
follows:
PYfT ¼ wjsg¼
s
w
   X mYS
j¼0
PYfL ¼ jg
wPYfL>j g
s w: ð13Þ
Note that 2   w   s.Af a i l e dhrep contention thus
implies that there are at least two receivers entering the
yield phase. Since, in hrep, the probability that no receiver
enters the yield phase is 0, the probability that more than
one receiver enters the yield phase is ð1   PEf1jngÞ.
  L0 L0ðw;s;nÞ is calculated as follows:
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TABLE 1
Mathematical Symbols Used in the Analysis  L0 L0ðw;s;nÞ¼
s
w
  
PmYS
j¼0 jPYfL ¼ jg
wPYfL>j g
s w
ð1   PEf1jngÞPYfT ¼ wjsg
: ð14Þ
In a failed transmission, the average number of the yield
slots before any receiver transmits a hrep when there are
s receivers in the yield phase, denoted as   L0 L0ðsÞ, is given as:
  L0 L0ðs;nÞ¼
X s
w¼2
  L0 L0ðw;s;nÞPYfT ¼ wjsg: ð15Þ
The average number of yield slots before any receiver
transmits a hrep when there are n receivers in the
elimination phase, denoted as   L0 L0
YðnÞ, is given as:
  L0 L0
YðnÞ¼
X n
s¼2
  L0 L0ðs;nÞPEfsjng: ð16Þ
Assume that a previous hrep contention with n con-
tenders fails and is followed by a new contention. Let
  D DRTðnÞ be the average contention time for a failed hrep
contention, which can be calculated by:
  D DRTðnÞ¼iSYNC þ 2iPS þ   B BEðnÞiES þ   L0 L0
YðnÞiYSþ iES:
ð17Þ
Let tfail be the time needed for the sender to detect a hrep
failure since it transmits rreq, which can be calculated by:
tfailðnÞ¼irreq þ DRTðnÞþihrep þ iSIFS: ð18Þ
The probability of a successful transmission among
n contending receivers in the elimination phase, denoted
as PTðnÞ, is:
PTðnÞ¼
X n
s¼0
PEfsjngPYfT ¼ 1jsg: ð19Þ
Assume that a sender has to send the rreq k times before it
receives a hrep successfully. The average delay for a sender
to determine its next hop when there are n neighboring
nodes contending to be the next hop is denoted by DREQðnÞ
and can be calculated by:
DREQðnÞ¼
X 1
k¼1
PTðnÞð1   PTðnÞÞ
k 1ðtsuccðnÞþð k   1ÞtfailðnÞÞ
¼ PTðnÞtsuccðnÞ
X 1
k¼1
ð1   PTðnÞÞ
k 1
þ tfailðnÞPTðnÞð1   PTðnÞÞ
X 1
k¼1
ðk   1Þð1   PTðnÞÞ
k 2
¼ tsuccðnÞþ
ð1   PTðnÞÞ
PTðnÞ
tfailðnÞ:
ð20Þ
Our observations and the data with some sample values
for various parameters is given in Section 5.
4.2 Routing Failure and Impact of Inaccurate
Position Information
The low-cost high-accuracy position service is not yet
available. There are relatively large position errors for
either the GPS system, or the cellular position (location)
service system, especially when considering that such a
facility used at the mobile device must be small and low
power-consuming.
In AO2P, the position error at senders or receivers may
make the receivers assign themselves to the wrong classes.
A node actually closer to the destination may lose hrep
contention to a node actually farther away. The end-to-end
multihop connection based on these inaccurate positions
may not be the best in terms of number of hops. However,
position errors will not cause a routing failure by generating
the links that actually do not exist, because only a node
receiving a rreq can possibly be the next hop. The
connection between a sender and a receiver thus is always
real regardless of wrong positions.
Assume that the maximum error of a position service is  ,
which means the real position may be as far as   away from
the position given by the position service provider. Assume
that the average geographic distance for each hop is d when
the correct positions are used. When there is a position
error, the percentile increase for the number of hops may at
most be 100  ð d
d   1Þ percent.
More seriously, position error may cause extra routing
discovery failure. Based on the wrong positions, a legit-
imate receiver may think it cannot process the rreq closer to
the destination and does not participate in hrep contention.
This potential link cannot be used by the sender even if it
cannot find any other legitimate next hop.
Fig. 6 illustrates the worst case of how the position error
affects AO2P routing discovery. r is the ad hoc radio
coverage. Due to the position error of  , a sender with the
actual position of F thinks that it is at the position F0. The
destination thinks that it is at D0 instead of D. Thus, the
sender thinks the distance between the destination and
itself is d instead of the real distance of d þ 2 . A legitimate
next hop can only be from S1, since only the nodes in S1 are
within the radio coverage from F and has a shorter distance
to D0 than that from F0 to D0. A route discovery failure will
occur if there is no node in S1. If both the sender and the
receiver have the right positions, the probability of a routing
failure will decrease. This occurs when there is no node in
both of the areas S1 and S2.
If a large number of N nodes are uniformly distributed in
an ad hoc network covering an area of S, the node density  
WU AND BHARGAVA: AO2P: AD HOC ON-DEMAND POSITION-BASED PRIVATE ROUTING PROTOCOL 343
Fig. 6. Impact of position error on routing discovery.then is N=S. For any area of S0, the probability that no node
resides in it, denoted as pS0ðn ¼ 0Þ, is as follows:
PS0ðn ¼ 0Þ¼ 1  
S0
S
   N
¼ 1  
S0
N= 
  
¼ 1  
 S0
N
   N
 S0
 !  S0
:
ð21Þ
 S0 is the number of the nodes residing in the area S0.
When N is large enough compared to  S0,
PS0ðn ¼ 0Þ e  S0 ð22Þ
The probability that there is at least one node in area S0,
denoted as PS0ðn   1Þ, is:
PS0ðn   1Þ¼1   PS0ðn ¼ 0Þ¼1   e  S0: ð23Þ
Let us define p1 as the probability of such a routing
discovery failure for the worst case of position errors and p2
as the probability of a routing discovery failure when there
is no position error. Referring back to Fig. 6, when the nodes
are uniformly distributed with a density of  , based on the
previous analysis results,
p1 ¼ e  S1;
p2 ¼ e  ðS1þS2Þ;
where S1 and S2 are functions of   and d.
In R-AO2P, d   r. At the source and each forwarding
node, the worst case scenario (refer to Fig. 6) results in
approximately the same S1 and S2. Therefore, the prob-
ability of a route discovery failure with and without
position error, i.e., p1 and p2, are approximately the same.
In a n-hop end-to-end connection, the probability of a
routing failure with and without position errors can be
calculated as 1  ð 1   p1Þ
n and 1  ð 1   p2Þ
n.
5I LLUSTRATIVE DATA AND OBSERVATIONS
In this section, we present both analysis and simulation
studies. We first present the analytical results on route
discovery delay and the probability of a failure in route
discovery based on accurate or inaccurate position informa-
tion. We then use a simulation model to study the
probability of a route discovery failure under destination
mobility and inaccurate positions. We also use simulation to
study the average number of hops for the generated routes
and the end-to-end throughput.
5.1 Analysis Results
5.1.1 The Average Delay for rreq Transmission Cycle
The major parameters in an AO2P hrep contention period
are set the same as those in HIPERLAN1 standard. The
number of slots in the prioritization phase, the elimination
phase, and the yield phase are 5, 12, and 9, with the
duration time of 7:2  s, 9  s, and 7:2  s, respectively. Time
duration for the synchronization interval is 11  s. Time
duration for SIFS and DIFS are 28  s and 128  s, as those in
WLAN. Note that the duration of DIFS is longer than the
duration of a complete yield phase. rreq, hrep, and cnfm are
transmitted at the rate of 1 Mb=s, with the length shown in
Fig. 2. An extra physical header of 128 bits is added to each
frame. ack has an overall length of 240 bits and is also
transmitted at the rate of 1 Mb=s.
Fig. 7 shows the probability of a successful hrep
transmission. It shows that, when PE, the parameter for a
node to adjust the burst length in the elimination phase, is
correctly chosen, the probability for a successful hrep
transmission is very high even when there are a large
number of contending receivers. The optimum successful
transmission rate occurs at PE ¼ 0:65, where the probabil-
ities of successful hrep transmissions are above 95 percent
for different number of contending nodes.
The corresponding average delay for a node to determine
its next hop (i.e., the average time for the completion of the
rreq transmission cycle) is shown in Fig. 8. In R-AO2P,
64 bytes are added in hrep and cnfm for Diffie-Hellman key
exchange. The curves of the delays are like the reverse of
those for the probabilities of successful transmission, which
means a high transmission probability results in a low next
hop searching delay. The results show that the average time
for the next hop discovery is only a few milliseconds. This
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Fig. 7. Probability for successful hrep transmission at different PE. Fig. 8. Average time to determine a next hop at different PE.means that a large delay in AO2P routing discovery can only
occur in a heavily-loaded network, where the delay for rreq
channel access is high. Such a delay may lead to a route
discovery failure if the destination moves away from its
previously reported position (as shown in Fig. 12). Thus,
AO2P can be looked at as a self-adaptive protocol as it
impedes a new data source to join a heavily-loaded network
through causing route discovery failure and prevents the
network congestion from getting worse.
5.1.2 Impact of Position Error
Fig. 9 shows the probabilities of a routing failure for
R-AO2P in the worst case scenario when there are different
maximum position errors. The results are based on the
assumptions that 3-hop connections are needed and nodes
are uniformly distributed. Routing failure increases as the
position error gets worse. The analysis results show that
when node density gets higher, the impact of the position
error is less significant.
5.2 Simulation Results
The simulation scenario is a network covering an area of
1;000 m   1;000 m, where a number of nodes are uniformly
deployed. The transmission range for the ad hoc channel is
250m. The receivers are divided into 4 classes according to
the rules in Section 3.3.
5.2.1 Impact of Position Error
Fig. 10 shows the increased probability of a routing failure
in AO2P as the position error gets worse. The x-axis is the
maximum position error  max. In simulation, the position of
a node used for route discovery is a distance away from its
real position. This distance is an assigned random value
distributed uniformly between 0 and  max. The data shows
that when node density is high, i.e., greater than 150=km2,
the probability of a routing failure is very low even when
the position error is large.
Fig. 11 shows the average number of hops for the
discovered routes at different position errors. It shows that,
as the value of maximum position error increases, the hop
number increases. However, the increase in the hop number
is not significant and will not have much impact on routing
performance.
5.2.2 Impact of Destination Mobility
Fig. 12 shows the probability of a routing discovery failure
caused by destination mobility. Such a routing failure will
not occur if the destination stays at the position known to the
source. We define the parameter drift of destination as the
distance that the destination is away from the position
carried in the rreq for routing discovery. It shows that, as the
drift value increases, the probability of a routing failure
increases. The impact of destination mobility is more
obvious in the network with low node densities. Fig. 12
can provide the distance threshold value based on which a
node has to update its position. For example, if the
probability of a route discovery failure caused by position
drift is required to be no more than 0:005, at low node
densities (50 nodes/km2), the threshold value should be no
more than 30m. At high node densities (100 nodes/km2 or
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Fig. 9. Routing failure at different position accuracy. Fig. 10. Probability of routing failure at different position accuracy.
Fig. 11. Average number of hops in a discovered route at different
position accuracy.above), a node need not update its position unless it is more
than 125 m away from the position it reported last time.
125 m is the half of the ad hoc radio transmission range.
Other than causing routing failure, the drift of destination
can also lead to inefficient routing. Fig. 13 shows that the
average hop number increases as the drift value increases.
The reason is that the rreq is forwarded to the destination
position. Therefore, a shortest path (in terms of number of
hops) to the destination normally cannot be found.
5.2.3 AO2P, R-AO2P, and GPSR Comparisons
Fig.14comparestheprobabilitiesofaroutediscovery failure
in the networks where AO2P, R-AO2P, and GPSR are used
for route discovery. For fair comparison, GPSR is modified
so that a node can be the next hop of a sender only when this
node is closer to the destination. It shows that AO2P and
GPSR have approximately the same probability for a routing
discovery failure. R-AO2P has a lower probability because it
allows a node leading the rreq away from the destination to
be the next hop. Note that, for R-AO2P, the probability of a
route discovery failure in simulation is higher than the
analytical results obtained and shown in Fig. 9. The reason is
that in simulation, a lot of nodes close to the boundary of the
network are included in the routes. It is more likely that
these nodes cannot find the legitimate next hop, which
results in a route discovery failure.
Fig. 15 compares the average number of hops for end-to-
end connections. It is observed that GPSR has the smallest
hop count, as it always uses the node that is closest to the
destination as the next hop. R-AO2P has larger hop counts
than AO2P, as nodes belonging to the class of lower priority
(farther from the destination) and cannot win the hrep
contention in AO2P may be assigned to the class of higher
priority in R-AO2P and win the contention. In all cases, the
average hop number of the routes decreases as the node
density gets higher.
Fig. 16 compares the simulated delivery ratio in the
network when routes are discovered by different protocols.
ns-2 is used as the simulator, as it has the well-developed
CSMA/CA model. Network has a medium size and
density, with 100 low-mobility nodes uniformly distributed
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Fig. 12. Routing discovery failure caused by the drift of destination.
Fig. 13. Average number of hops at different drift values.
Fig. 14. Routing discovery failure in AO2P, R-AO2P, and GPSR.
Fig. 15. Average number of hops for AO2P, R-AO2P, and GPSR.in a 1;000 m   1;000 m area. The constant bit rate flow is
used as data input for each connection, with the data packet
arrival rate of four per second and a packet size of 512 bytes.
The available data rate in an ad hoc channel is 1 Mb=s.I t
shows that, generally, GPSR has the highest delivery ratio
as it has the minimum hop count. R-AO2P has the lowest
delivery ratio. However, the routing performance degrada-
tion in AO2P and R-AO2P is not significant.
6C ONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
This research proposes a routing algorithm, named AO2P,
to achieve communication privacy in ad hoc networks.
Node position, instead of identity, is used for route
discovery. Only limited position information is revealed
to the network to protect node anonymity. In an enhanced
algorithm R-AO2P, the position of a reference point,
instead of the position of the destination, is used to further
improve destination anonymity. We use analysis and
simulation to evaluate the routing performance for the
proposed algorithms.
In the MAC layer, we build an analytical model to
evaluate the extra delay caused by the proposed receiver
contention scheme. We find that the delay is small and a
search for the next hop in AO2P or R-AO2P takes only a few
milliseconds. Such a delay does not result in the failure of a
route discovery even if destinations are highly mobile.
In the network layer, we first use analysis and simulation
models to evaluate the impact of position error on route
discoveries. It is observed that a large error may cause
inefficient routing, i.e., routes built upwith a greater number
of hops, or may even cause a route failure. However, this
impact is less significant in the networks with high node
densities. For example, in a network with a node density of
200=km2, the probability of a route discovery failure can be
as low as 0:001 even if the position error is as high as the half
of the maximum ad hoc radio coverage. We use simulation
to study the impact of destination mobility. The movement
of a destination makes its position known by the source
incorrect. However, it is observed that a route discovery
based on a “false” destination position may not necessarily
leads to a route discovery failure. Again, in networks with
high node densities, the impact of destination mobility is
less significant. The results can be used to determine the
distance threshold value in the distance-based position
update system, where an ad hoc node updates its position
when its current position is more than a distance away from
the last reported one. Finally, we compare the routing
performance between AO2P/E-AO2P and GPSR. We
compare the hop counts in the routes discovered by these
algorithms. It is observed that the routes in AO2P or R-AO2P
have only marginally greater hop counts than in GPSR, yet
GPSR requires much more position information. Simulation
also shows that the corresponding end-to-end throughput
degradation in AO2P and R-AO2P is not significant.
Therefore, AO2P preserves communication privacy without
significant routing performance degradation.
We propose the following two future research directions:
. Privacy evaluation. Internal attackers are able to
obtain pieces of position information of their targets.
Based on this information, they can estimate the
trajectories of their target or reduce the anonymity
set. The level of destination anonymity can then be
quantified by a probability of matching a position to
any node ID. This can be calculated if node mobility,
traffic pattern, and the policies for position services
are given. Future work will include building
analytical models for mobility and traffic based on
which node anonymity can be quantified. Other
than probabilities, entropy and size of anonymity
sets will also be considered as the metric for
anonymity evaluation.
. Security issues and mitigation techniques. In
AO2P, the next hop is determined by node conten-
tion. A malicious node can always use the most
aggressive contention mechanism to become the
next hop. Once it is included in a route, it can
conduct different attacks, such as changing the
position of destination in the routing request or
dropping/fabricating data packets after the route is
built up. More seriously, protecting the privacy of
intermediate nodes in AO2P makes it almost
impossible to identify these attackers. A modified
channel contention scheme will be developed. The
next hop cannot be decided by a receiver itself, but
by both the sender and the receiver. Information
exchange is needed based on which a required trust
between a previous hop and its potential next hop
can be assessed. The privacy degradation due to
such information requires investigation. Incentives
for a node to be a forwarder at the cost of the
degraded privacy has to be provided.
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Fig. 16. Data packet delivery ratio in AO2P, R-AO2P, and GPSR.REFERENCES
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